The Untapped Potential Of the BRICS
by Zara Hayat, International Relations Correspondent at Intelligence Forums
The BRICS have been a concept periodically flowing in and out of mainstream media for the last two decades not only due to their unique and intriguing nature but especially given recent stirs in the geopolitical landscape regarding talks of Canada joining the EU as an associate member and the US’s reaction to that, the 2026 UNGA that just passed and most recently the controversy regarding NVIDIA’s CEO and what that means for the AI technological race between China and the States, the topic of the BRICS is therefore gaining increasing traction. This article briefly highlights what constitutes the BRICS and their trajectory before moving onto examining the gaps in the organisation and what the organisation has the potential to be at its fully utilised capacity.
The BRICS alliance was originally created in 2006 by the countries’ foreign ministers at UNGA. At its inception it consisted of Brazil, Russia, India and China on the basis of promoting mutually beneficial economic prosperity. Four years later it was agreed to expand BRIC into BRICS adding South Africa on the same basis. Between then and 2025 Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and the UAE formally joined this forum creating 10- 11 core members (ambiguity regarding the membership of Saudi Arabia) and several more became partner countries with time. It’s worth noting that cumulatively they represent roughly 40% of global GDP in PPP terms and nearly half of the human population.
Now something all these countries have in common is that they are either some of the biggest and strongest economies in the world or they hold some of the most critical global shipping routes in the world such as Iran having primary authority over the Strait of Hormuz whose gravity is especially highlighted these days or China’s Arctic Silk Road that bypasses traditional western controlled maritime chokepoints by passing through Russia's Northern Sea Route to connect Asian and European shipping hubs, inadvertently holding authority over the state of the global economy.
Both of these elements combined one would think the BRICS would have been consistently making grand strides in the world of foreign affairs and the global economic landscape for the last two decades and truthfully in some cases they have created some unparalleled changes to world order for example the creation of the New Development Bank or the De-dollarisation initiative for the last decade to trade in their local currencies instead of using the US Dollar (an initiative France’s Emmanuel Macron has voiced his support for time and time again). Last year they hit the 245 trillion mark processing that equivalent volume in yuan-denominated transactions. This is all in line with their consistent advocacy for Global Governance Reform. They choose to act in line with their words, advocating for a multipolar world order and for structural changes to the IMF, World Bank, and most notably the UN security framework.
That being said, there is increasing discourse on how despite all this, it is the gaps or shortcomings in the organisation that holds them back from utilising its full potential. The most glaring shortfall would be the fact that the alliance is often in tension with itself for example the internal political rivalry that holds them back. Between India and China’s constant tensions to gain the edge within the bloc, Saudi Arabia and Iran over oil and trade, Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile dam, and India and Brazil’s different positions on the UN Security Council. Another avenue and maybe the crux of the reasons being the disparity existing in the bloc's aggregate weight and its internal integration and influence distribution which could hail almost ironic considering that not only were they created to combat this inequity and have been advocating for such reform as well. And this is where the distinction between possessing economic weight and actually being able to operationalise said weight becomes of particular concern. In May of this year, India’s Commerce Ministry reported that the intra-BRICS merchandise trade had expanded more than thirteen-fold since 2003, reaching approximately the equivalent of US$1.17 trillion by 2024. Yet that incredible figure still represented only around 5 per cent of global trade and was largely carried out by the emerging superpowers in the group most notably and unsurprisingly China instead of a more equitable distribution of trade and economic coordination. In other words, the economic mass of BRICS has expanded considerably faster than the architecture connecting its economies and at the hands of a few members bearing the brunt or dominating some may argue. Whilst this phenomenon is not uncommon and noticeable in most if not all ‘alliances’ what makes this cause for concern standout here is that this alliance was conceived to combat this very problem.
Furthermore UNCTAD’s 2026 assessment finds that BRICS cooperation remains heavily dependent on relatively soft mechanisms of coordination, while differences in regulatory systems, institutional capacity and national economic priorities continue to constrain deeper integration and perpetuate inequality. It’s important to highlight that consequentially there is still no comprehensive BRICS-wide trade arrangement capable of systematically reducing those frictions. This is also why up until present day the BRICS+ alliance chooses to call itself an alliance or grouping instead of the more sturdy and durable term of an IGO even explicitly stating on their website that they are not formally an international organisation which even this wording alone ends up watering down their own potential of collective economic weight as the sheer foundation of the creation is tumultuous to begin with, which paves a weak and incoherent path for prosperity moving forward.
One way to combat this or one part of utilising their collective authority would be implementing what UNCTAD (UN Trade and Development) calls a “Trade+” strategy, connecting trade policy with macro-financial cooperation, industrial development, digital and data governance, regulatory frameworks and stronger institutional capacity rather than simply treating trade liberalisation as an isolated and precarious objective. Additionally with China being a core member, the rest of the countries and the alliance collectively have the potential to use that to their advantage instead of it being a point of contention and intimidation in the sense of China doing a lot of the heavy work in terms of push back against the US dominating world order. The foundation of this constant loggerhead and cold war could be used to the BRICS advantage by strengthening their collective hard and soft force.
And that in sum illustrates what the unrealised and untapped potential of BRICS actually is. At its fully utilised capacity, BRICS would not necessarily need to replicate the European Union or NATO nor compete with them to become a supranational economic union completely upending world order as we know it. Its comparative advantage may instead lie in becoming a cohesive interoperable transcontinental economic platform. Not only being one in which goods, services, capital, payment systems, development finance and eventually digital infrastructure can move between some of the largest emerging markets with substantially lower institutional and transactional friction but more importantly one that can stand and work together in the face of adversity under binding transnational law and frameworks in areas of economy and economic shipping routes yes but also health, climate, AI etc. Their strength is what is supposed to lie in their exclusivity and uniqueness not be their weak point. The foundations of that architecture already exist from the New Development Bank to work on cross-border payment interoperability, local-currency financing, digital public infrastructure and increasingly resilient supply chains but they remain considerably less integrated than the underlying economic resources of the member states would permit.
Given their size in every respect from geography to authority to GDP to population to hard and soft powers, if utilised at full capacity it could translate into something highly consequential and more importantly sustainable. A substantially more and close to fully reliant and self-sufficient centre of trade, investment, development finance and transnational operational frameworks within an increasingly fragile international economic system.